We estimate the sensitivity of scrap decisions to changes in used car values -the "scrap elasticity" -and show how it influences used car fleets under policies aimed at reducing gasoline use. Large scrap elasticities produce emissions leakage under efficiency standards as the longevity of used vehicles is increased, a process known as the Gruenspecht effect. To explore the magnitude of this leakage we assemble a novel dataset of U.S. used vehicle registrations and prices, which we relate through time via differential effects in gasoline cost: A gasoline price increase or decrease of $1 changes used vehicle prices and alters the number of fuel-efficient vs. fuel-inefficient vehicles scrapped by 18%. These relationships allow us to provide what we believe are the first estimates of the scrap elasticity itself, which we find to be about -0.7. When applied in a model of fuel economy standards, the central elasticities we estimate suggest that 12-17% of the expected fuel savings will leak away through the used vehicle market. This considerably reduces the cost-effectiveness of the standard, rivaling or exceeding the importance of the often-cited mileage "rebound" effect.
Introduction
The global stock of vehicles has now passed one billion and continues to grow rapidly. 1 In the U.S., passenger vehicles are the source of 19 percent of carbon dioxide emissions and the share is rising rapidly in developing economies (EPA, 2013) . While considerable attention has been paid to regulation of fuel consumption of new vehicles, the vast used market -94% of the vehicle fleet in the U.S. is more than one year old -is much less well understood. The way the used fleet evolves through scrap decisions has important consequences for overall gasoline consumption and the associated environmental and geopolitical externalities.
We examine the relation between used vehicle scrap rates, the gasoline price, and used car resale value. The extent to which the fuel economy of used cars is elastic -via differential rates of scrap as used car prices change across the fleet -influences the entire suite of policies meant to reduce gasoline use. 2 Despite this, there has been surprisingly little empirical guidance on the relevant elasticity of used vehicle scrappage.
We address three specific questions: First, what is the effect of gasoline price changes on scrap rates? Second, what is the elasticity of the scrap rate with respect to used vehicle prices? And third, how does this scrap elasticity interact with fuel economy policy?
We begin by developing a novel dataset that includes a detailed history of used vehicle prices and registrations at the make, model, and trim level. We include all vehicle registrations in the U.S. over the period 1993-2009 and estimate the responsiveness of used vehicle prices and scrap rates to changes in the gasoline price, addressing the first question above. Higher retail gasoline prices mean fuel-efficient cars are scrapped less while the largest, thirstiest cars are scrapped more.
Also, the resale value of fuel-efficient cars rises relative to fuel-inefficient cars.
We then estimate the used vehicle scrap elasticity with respect to vehicle price, using the relationship between gasoline prices and used vehicle values as the first stage in an instrumental variables approach. We estimate this elasticity to average approximately -0.7 with important heterogeneity over ages and vehicle types. 3 Identification in our approach comes from a combination of cross-sectional and time series variation, caused by differential impacts of gasoline price changes on models of different fuel economies as well as the impact of gasoline price changes on a particular vintage through time.
Finally, we use our estimates to simulate the more complex interaction between scrap elasticity and fuel economy policy. Early work by Gruenspecht (1982) highlights the mechanism we are interested in measuring: When new vehicle prices rise due to tightened fuel economy regulation, the prices of used vehicles also increase in equilibrium. This gives used vehicle owners an incentive to postpone the decision to scrap their vehicles, leading to a larger used vehicle fleet that also has a lower average fuel-efficiency. The reduction in scrap is particularly strong for heavy vehicles with large engines. Since manufacturers can comply with fuel economy standards by selling fewer gas guzzlers and more gas sippers ("mix shifting"), the demand for used gas guzzlers increases, which in turns decreases their scrap rates. This "used car leakage" is a manifestation of incomplete regulation, because the fuel economy policy applies to the new vehicle market only. 4 Used car leakage is important to the effectiveness of a wide range of existing and proposed fuel economy standards, including the European Union's 2020 fuel economy targets, targets in Japan for 2015, and the U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards. 5, 6 We estimate the magnitude of the effect in a stylized model of the U.S. vehicle fleet, directly tying the results to our estimates of the scrap elasticity. We find that 12-17% of the expected fuel savings from fuel economy standards will leak away through the used vehicle market. This effect has often been overlooked by economists and policy makers, yet we find that it rivals or exceeds the importance of the often-cited mileage "rebound" effect.
Our results on scrappage can also be applied to a range of other gasoline policies. A gasoline tax includes as part of its effect a change in scrap rates that improves average used car efficiency; the degree of this change depends on the scrap elasticity. Further, our estimates allow consideration of the effects of vehicle subsidies that target particular classes, or incentives such as scrap bonuses that alter prices and scrap rates in the used market directly.
Our work builds on a series of recent papers examining the effects of gasoline prices on the used car market, a relation we take advantage of in our instrumental variables approach. Busse In contrast, we work to isolate the influence of the used vehicle price itself on scrap, allowing us to investigate the Gruenspecht effect in the context of fuel economy standards. To our knowledge the only prior empirical work looking at the relation between used vehicle values and the scrap rate consists of two case studies based on policy shocks (Hahn, 1995; Alberini, Harrington and McConnell, 1998) . The data from these studies is insufficient to construct price-scrap response curves over a meaningful range and they are confined to small geographic regions. 7 Bento, Roth We are able to capture the decisions of both groups, examining the entire used fleet using data on vehicle registrations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset we assemble.
Section 3 explores the relation between gasoline prices, used vehicle prices, and scrap rates, and Section 4 uses these relationships to provide instrumented estimates of the vehicle scrap elasticity itself. Section 5 applies our elasticity estimates, simulating the influence of the scrap elasticity on fuel economy standards.
Data
We have assembled a panel of data on used vehicles from two industry sources: The R.L. Polk company maintains a database of vehicle registrations in the U.S. by individual vehicle identification number (VIN). The National Automobile Dealer's Association (NADA) combines auction and sale records to produce monthly used vehicle valuations at the sub-model level.
Due to the potential for lag in the registration data (available as often as quarterly) we work only with annual variation. The coarseness of the time series is counterbalanced by very fine crosssectional variation, where we can measure prices and registrations for each 10-digit VIN prefix separately. This allows us to distinguish not only vehicle models, but also engine, body style (e.g., 4-door or 2-door), and certain optional features (e.g., horsepower, weight, MSRP) in each observation. Data is aggregate at the level of the U.S. (we assume the used car market is liquid across states).
We merge fuel economies, options, and characteristics for each vehicle by VIN prefix. The NADA data provides a crosswalk from the VIN prefix to model, body-style, and "trim" (e.g., "LX", "DX", etc.) as well as data on some car characteristics. From there we match the car description to EPA fuel economy ratings back to 1978.
briefly explore the magnitude of "used car leakage". They find that, depending on the scrap elasticity, the effectiveness of fuel economy standards can be substantially reduced. 8 Other authors have investigated the effectiveness of the Car Allowance Rebate System ("cash for clunkers") program along several dimensions: Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2012) find that it increased consumer welfare and did not significantly affect prices in the used market. Mian and Sufi (2012) provide evidence that cash for clunkers changed the timing of new vehicle purchases without leading to additional purchases or significant fiscal stimulus.
The most complete and consistently coded data span the period 1999 to 2009 and we focus our analysis on this period. 9 In each year we consider vehicles between 1 and 19 years old, measuring the fraction scrapped as the change in registrations from the previous year. Our measure of scrap rate is therefore most precisely described as a change in size of the legally operated U.S. fleet, shown in equation (3) below. We do not distinguish exported or unregistered vehicles from those that are scrapped, though these components appear to be a small part of annual changes in the fleet: US Census Bureau statistics show that exports of used vehicles averaged 390 thousand per year during our sample period, comprising about 5% of our total scrappage measure. 10 Table 1 displays a summary of vehicle scrap rates and prices through age 19. Vehicles that are 20 and older represent only 1.6% of the registered fleet and we drop them due to difficulty obtaining data for the oldest vintages. Overall, we see that vehicle scrap rates increase gradually with age There is also considerable heterogeneity among manufacturers: Panel (a) in Figure 1 displays scrap profiles by age for a selection of vehicle brands. Scrap rates are relatively similar over the first few years with considerable heterogeneity emerging at older ages. Luxury brands tend to have the lowest scrap rates as they age. Panel (b) in Figure 1 displays scrap rates after dividing all vehicles into quartiles by fuel economy. The heterogeneity in this dimension is particularly interesting for policy: As vehicles age the more fuel-efficient vehicles are scrapped faster. Like differences across brands, heterogeneity in scrap rates appears most strongly in the second decade of the vehicle's life. For the oldest vehicles, scrap rates are nearly twice as high in the most fuel-efficient cars.
Equilibrium Effects of Gasoline Price Changes
We begin with a description of the relation between gasoline prices and valuation of used vehicles, key to the first stage of our scrap elasticity estimates in Section 4. Following Busse et al. (2013) we divide vehicles according to fuel economy quartiles and examine the response to gasoline price changes. Focusing on the relative effect across quartiles allows flexible controls for time and vehicle age. Macroeconomic indicators that co-vary with gasoline prices, for example, could increase or decrease the attractiveness of used cars in general. This is something we are able to take out by focusing exclusively on shifts in composition.
As argued in the earlier literature, higher gas prices will tend to increase the value of gas sippers and decrease the value of gas guzzlers. The scrap effects move in the opposite direction, with higher gas prices leading to increased scrappage of gas guzzlers and reduced scrappage of gas sippers. The fuel economy of the used fleet is therefore not fixed, but has an elasticity with respect to gasoline price.
Effect of Gasoline Price on Used Car Prices
We first report the equilibrium impact of gasoline price on used vehicle prices following the specification in Busse et al. (2013) . Our results match theirs closely. We aggregate vehicle vintages due to our coarser time series and lack of regional variation, but our data has the advantage of measuring the effect on vehicle prices over a much wider range of ages. 11 We employ the following specification for equilibrium price changes:
where subscript a is vehicle age in years, m is make and model (e.g., Toyota Camry) and t is the year of observation. α am are fixed effects for each model-age combination (e.g., a 5-year-old Toyota Camry) and α at are fixed effects for year-age combinations (e.g., is omitted). These coefficients reflect the influence of gasoline price on vehicle price depending on relative fuel efficiency. Because we cannot control for vehicle vintage within a given make-model (Busse et al. (2013) are able to do this using regional and monthly variation) we instead introduce additional controls in z amt to account for vintage-specific differences in attributes across vintages.
z amt includes horsepower, weight, and the original retail price suggested by the manufacturer. We estimate by least squares and cluster all standard errors at the make-model-age level.
The estimation exploits a combination of time series and cross-sectional variation, using the differential effect of a change in gasoline price across vehicles depending on their fuel economies.
The fixed effects for age by year allow the average price of vehicles of each age to vary freely over time, and the age-model effects similarly allow the price of each model to vary flexibly as it ages.
The variation that remains is the price differential between vehicles of varying fuel economies: We estimate the change in price differential between the least efficient quartile and each of the higher three. Table 2 Notes: All models include fixed effects for each make-model-age combination. Change in price for the least efficient (first) quartile is omitted in order to allow fixed effects by age-year. Standard errors clustered by make-model-age. *,** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Our sample allows us to differentiate the price changes across quartiles by age, looking closely at the interaction between gasoline prices and remaining vehicle lifetimes. We find that the difference in price effects drops off sharply from about $2,900 among the newest used cars to less than $1,000 among vehicles ten years and older (for a constant $1 change in gasoline price). Busse et al. (2013) argue that the price effects across quartiles indicate near-full adjustment on the part of consumers, modeling gasoline cost over the remaining expected life of the vehicles. This corresponds well with our finding of smaller price effects among older, and therefore closer to retirement, used vehicles.
Effect of Gasoline Price on Scrap Rates: Composition
We now depart from the analysis in Busse et al. (2013) and begin our examination of scrap rates.
As shown in Figure 1 , the scrap rate for relatively new vehicles is low and rises slowly through the first five years of age. This is not surprising considering that these vehicles still retain much of their original value; scrappage for such vehicles is mostly the result of severe accidents yielding damage to the structure of the vehicle. We will show that gasoline prices do not affect the scrap rate of this newer set of used cars very much (in absolute terms) as they imply relatively small percentage changes in vehicle value. Instead, absolute changes in scrap rates concentrate in much older vehicles where maintenance and minor accidents yield a more flexible margin for the scrap decision.
We repeat the specification in (1), now considering scrap rates in place of prices:
where y amt is the fraction of vehicles of age a and model m that are scrapped between year t − 1 and t. We construct scrap rates by tracking individual vehicle models of each vintage and mapping the scrap rates as they pass different ages. Age is measured as the difference between observation year t and vintage year v. Specifically, we define the scrap rate as:
The numerator is the count of vehicles scrapped (we observe each registration) and the denominator is the count in the previous year. The overall measure is then the fraction scrapped from one year to the next.
The results from specification (2) are presented in Table 3 . Overall, we find that when gasoline price increases by $1, vehicles with the best fuel economy experience a change in their scrap rate that is about 1 percentage point less than vehicles with the worst fuel economy. In terms of scrap counts, this corresponds to an 11% reduction in the number of efficient vehicles that are scrapped relative to the least efficient quartile.
The effects of gasoline price changes on scrap rates are largest for the older subset of vehicles in the sample: Among cars more than 9 years old scrap rates in the highest MPG quartile fall by more than 2 percentage points for a $1 increase in the price of gasoline (relative to cars in the lowest MPG quartile). On a base scrap rate of 12.8%, this effect amounts to an 18% decline in the count of fuel-efficient vehicles scrapped. Notes: Coefficient values reflect percentage point changes. All models include fixed effects for each make-model-age combination. Change in scrap rate for the least efficient (first) quartile is omitted in order to allow fixed effects by age-year. Standard errors clustered by make-model-age. *,** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Turning Points in a Continuous Specification
We also consider an alternative version of (1) and (2) that, in place of the quartile approach above, specifies prices and scrap rates as a direct function of each vehicle's fuel economy. The model we adopt is similar to Li et al. (2009) and obtains a measure of "turning points" with respect to fuel economy. Our data allows us to consider their approach not only for scrap rates, but also for used vehicle prices. Section 4 will relax this structure and return to a more general approach.
We estimate the following models:
where dollars per mile, DP M mt , is calculated as gasprice t /M P G m and α a * t is a linear time trend that varies by age. Equations (4) and (5) impose the restriction that vehicles at the extremes (highest and lowest DP M ) will see the largest changes in price and scrap. Specifically, if β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0, there exists a critical MPG-value above which used vehicle prices increase (or above which scrap rates decrease) when the gasoline price goes up. The reverse holds for scrap rates in equation (5) . Table 4 reports the estimation results of specifications (4) and (5), for all vehicles (columns 1 and 3) and for a restricted sample of vehicles ten years and older (columns 2 and 4). The coefficients on gasprice t and DP M mt have opposite signs in all four cases, allowing calculation of the "turning point" in MPG where the sign of the response changes. When gasoline prices increase, vehicles with fuel economies above the turning point see their prices increase and scrap rates decrease. (4) and (5). All models include fixed effects for each make-model-age combination, and a linear time trend for each age. Standard errors clustered by make-model-age. *,** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. These results are consistent with Tables 2 and 3 . The average fuel economy in quartile 1 is 15.2 MPG, while the average MPG in quartile 4 is 27.2. The estimates in Table 4 predict a price differential of $974 and a scrap rate differential of 2.12 percentage points. This corresponds closely to the price differential of $952 in Table 2 and the scrap rate differential of 2.27 percentage points.
The turning point specification has the nice feature of using continuous variation in fuel economy, but suffers from the requirement that linear trends be imposed on prices and scrap rates over time. 12 We find that this restriction leads to much less plausible results for newer vehicles in our sample:
Sharp effects of the recession, for example, cannot be modeled and could explain the asymmetric turning points in price and scrap shown in the tables.
We therefore move to a more flexible specification for our main elasticity estimates in Section 4, building a model that combines the best features of the specifications above: We combine a continuous measure of fuel economy with the flexibility of the quartile model to exploit changes in relative, rather than absolute, prices and fuel economies.
Estimating the Scrap Elasticity
We now estimate the used vehicle price elasticity of the scrap rate 13 using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. While the estimates above demonstrate the reduced form influence of rising gasoline prices on scrap rates (and therefore could suggest the effect of an increase in the gasoline tax), our goal here is to instead model the effect of vehicle price changes in the used market.
This elasticity is useful, for example, in considering a policy to subsidize new vehicles of a particular type. The policy would reduce the demand and price for used versions of those same vehicles, creating a change in scrap rates. More generally below, fuel economy rules will generate a whole pattern of such demand and price shifts through the used fleet.
Econometric Framework
We estimate the following model using a panel IV estimator, relating the natural logs of the scrap rate y and vehicle price p such that γ can be interpreted as the elasticity:
wherep amt denotes the predicted values from a first stage (we also present the corresponding OLS estimates below). Notice that the scrap rate in (6) ultimately reflects decisions made on the "supply" side of this market (e.g., auction houses, mechanics, and salvage yards), so to identify the elasticity in question we will employ instruments that shift demand.
We use a set of instruments that interact the fuel economies of different vintages and models with contemporaneous gasoline prices. 14 A particularly appealing aspect of using model-level interactions is that it allows us to flexibly remove all changes in scrap rates at the age-year level through fixed effects in α at . Most complications from the dramatic swings in macroeconomic indicators during our sample period can therefore be absorbed.
As before, the model in (6) also includes a full set of fixed effects for each model-age of vehicle (e.g., a 5-year-old Toyota Camry receives its own fixed effect for the scrap rate). The age-year effects mentioned above will then capture patterns like improved reliability in newer vintages (to the extent they are correlated across different models). We next discuss identification and assumptions on the error, ε amt .
Identifying Assumptions
Estimating the scrap elasticity by directly regressing the scrap rate on the used vehicle price suffers from the usual endogeneity of prices in equilibrium: Demand shifts over time will trace out the 13 We define this elasticity as the percent change in the scrap rate associated with a 1% increase in the value of a vehicle on the used market.
14 The intuition for this instrument comes from Section 3.1: Shocks to gasoline prices affect the value of used vehicles with different fuel economies differently. A $1 increase in the gasoline price will increase the resale value of a Toyota Prius relative to a Toyota Camry. This is the source of variation that we use for identification.
relationship between prices and scrappage that we want to estimate, but unobserved changes on the scrap side of the market will tend to mute the relationship and bias our elasticity estimate toward zero. Our main identifying assumptions then surround the demand shifters we use as instruments.
The strength of the instruments in influencing demand is perhaps most easily seen in Section 3, showing how gasoline price shocks create sharply differential changes in prices for vehicles with better or worse fuel economies. The predictive power for model-level prices is reflected in the high first-stage F-statistics shown alongside the instrumented elasticity estimates in Table 5 . Other demand shifters, for example changes over time in preference for vehicle size or performance, would be equally valid though are more difficult to collect data on. 15 The validity of our instruments also depends on an exclusion restriction applying to the scrappage side of the model: We require that unobserved factors determining the scrap rate (for example mechanics' wages, prices of used vehicle parts, and other components of used car salvage and dealing) be uncorrelated with differential fuel cost changes across models. Our age by year effects again enter very importantly: We implicitly allow unobserved factors of this type (even when correlated with gasoline price) that influence the scrap rates of all cars of the same age similarly.
Another way of stating the exclusion restriction is that we need gasoline prices to affect differential scrappage of efficient and inefficient vehicles only through their effect on vehicle prices. The recurring decision problem faced by a used vehicle owner provides a foundation for this argument:
In any given year, he faces a random repair cost shock and must decide whether to repair and keep the vehicle, repair and sell it at the current price, or scrap it. He will choose scrap if and only if the price in the used market falls below the realized repair cost (net any residual value). If not, he will be better off selling the car to someone else. Importantly, these sorts of individual vehicle trades do not enter our model; we only want to consider the final decision to scrap when no one at all is interested in owning the vehicle. This final decision to scrap depends on the used vehicle price, repair cost realization, and scrap value, but generally not on demand-side parameters such as utility from owning and operating the vehicle and -importantly -not on relative fuel cost versus other models.
These assumptions are robust to heterogeneity in consumer preferences across vehicles and also to heterogeneous valuation of fuel economy. A potentially complicating factor is transaction cost, which can make keeping a vehicle more attractive relative to either scrapping or selling. Under some conditions, the scrap decision could then depend on prices of other vehicles, which in turn depend on gasoline cost. We argue that the relevant transaction cost in our setting is likely to be limited: The final person to face the scrap-or-repair decision for a given vehicle is likely to be a mechanic or someone operating the vehicle on a salvage title. This group generally faces lower search and information costs than a typical owner, making the scrap-or-repair margin we have in mind the relevant choice. 16 Finally, the error term in (6) includes some of the unobservables already mentioned above: 15 To the extent these sorts of preference changes have an influence on the price of oil over time (as shown in Kilian (2009)) we are implicitly able to make use of some of this variation in our existing instruments. 16 This simple model can be formalized and the derivation is available upon request.
Mechanics' wages, prices of used vehicles parts, and transaction costs. In addition it will contain any remaining idiosyncratic differences across vintages of a particular model. For example, there may be annual quality differences in the fleet of new Honda Civics sold. Higher quality vintages are likely to have lower scrap rates in each year as they age; we find some evidence in support of this in Section 4.4. 17 The estimates of the scrap elasticity are unaffected, however, suggesting that vintage-based effects are not correlated with variation in gasoline prices later in the vehicle's life.
Results
The first panel of Table 5 presents the elasticity estimates, γ, estimated from Equation (6) by OLS.
The elasticity over all vehicles averages -0.58. The remaining three panels detail our IV approach, accounting for potential bias by isolating shifts in the demand side of the market using fuel economy interacted with gasoline price. The panels correspond to increasing flexibility in the first stage of the IV estimator.
Since the basic intuition for our instrumenting strategy comes out of the quartile model in Equation (1) we first present results that import these estimates (appearing in Table 2 ) directly as the first stage. The elasticity results from this basic specification appear in the second panel of Table 5 , with an overall elasticity estimate of -0.83.
We next move to a pair of specifications that take advantage of considerably more variation across vehicles. Rather than lumping all vehicles of the same quartile together to predict prices, we can add detail at the make-model level. The first stage becomes:
where DP M mt measures the time-varying cost of a mile driven at the vehicle model level (each interaction of fuel cost and gasoline price effectively acts as a separate instrument). We prefer this approach to using (1) as the first stage since it leverages much more of the variation in our data, creating more precise first stage estimates and also removing bias that could result from uneven distribution of cars of different age categories across quartiles. These results appear in the third panel where the average elasticity is -0.70.
Finally, we move to our most flexible (and preferred) specification. Now we instrument not only with relative fuel cost changes at the make-model level, but also differentiate by vehicle age.
Specifically, our preferred first stage is:
We continue to include all fixed effects as before and now predict price changes for each makemodel and age separately; DP M amt includes all variation at the age-model-time level. The fourth panel reveals quite similar elasticities to the somewhat more aggregate instruments used in the third panel. Table 5 also explores differences in the elasticity across age categories. Generally we find fairly similar elasticities across ages, declining somewhat for the very oldest cars. We estimate the price elasticity of used vehicle scrappage to be about -0.7 for all vehicle ages grouped together. Our preferred specifications indicate that scrappage of 2-9 year-old vehicles is slightly more price elastic (-0.9) than scrappage of 10-19 year-old vehicles (-0.6). This likely reflects high baseline scrap rates among the oldest vehicles.
While we expect the OLS estimates to be biased toward zero, the IV estimates suggest that the size of the bias is relatively small. This would be the case if the variation in our setting is coming mainly through shocks to demand. This accords well with anecdotal evidence about the car market: Changes in gasoline prices and vehicle preferences seem to be rapid and large relative to movements in the physical repair and salvage costs governing the scrappage side of the market. Table 6 decomposes our elasticity estimates by vehicle class again using the preferred instruments at the make-model-age level. Heterogeneity across classes is fairly limited with the exception of pickup trucks: Our point estimate is a scrap elasticity of -0.4 as compared with -0.7 in the full sample.
Heterogeneity and Robustness Checks
We find somewhat more heterogeneity in the scrap elasticity for older used vehicles, which are also the most relevant group from a policy perspective given their high absolute scrap rates. Older pickups exhibit much more inelastic scrap behavior, while scrappage of small and large sedans is also somewhat less elastic (-0.5). In contrast, the scrap elasticity for older SUVs and vans is larger than average (-0.9). Since SUVs and vans are the majority of the light truck fleet this suggests that the scrappage of old, large vehicles on average tends to respond the most strongly to changes in used vehicle prices. Notes: The first stage of the IV includes DPM by make-model-age variables. All models include fixed effects for each make-model-age and each age-year combination. Standard errors clustered by make-model-age appear in parentheses.
We next consider robustness to changes in miles driven across vehicles. If gas price movements cause strong substitution in miles driven between vehicles this has the potential to make our elasticity estimates conservative: For example if small cars are driven relatively more when gas prices rise they will have more accidents and breakdowns, shifting the distribution of repair cost shocks that underlies the scrap decision. We expect this effect to be small: the price changes identifying the elasticity reflect fuel costs over the life of the vehicle while any effects from mileage adjustment would enter only in the year of observation. Nevertheless, we conduct an experiment with the data to bound this effect, considering a price elasticity of driving of 1.0 (near the top of the range of estimates in the literature) and adjusting all scrap rates fully proportionally with miles. 18 This adjustment increases the magnitude of our elasticity estimates by only about 0.01, leading us to abstract from mileage in the main specification.
Finally, Table 7 explores a variety of subsets of the data and additional alternative assumptions.
We find that the elasticity estimates are generally robust: Notes: All estimates here are variations on the make-model level instruments reported in the third panel of Table  5 . All include fixed effects for each make-model-age and each age-year combination. Standard errors clustered by make-model-age appear in parentheses.
Excluding luxury models: Excluding luxury models (about 25% of our make-model combinations when classified on brand and price) has only a small effect on the estimates. Average prices are of course much lower in this subset, suggesting similar elasticities across prices within an age category.
Using only increases/decreases in gasoline price: Our point estimate is somewhat smaller when using only years where gas prices have fallen, though it remains similar and the difference is not statistically significant.
Small vs. large increases/decreases in gasoline price: The point estimates are similar for years in which the (absolute value of the) change in the gasoline price is above or below the median change.
Hence, the elasticity estimates do not seem to be driven by years with large vehicle price shocks and consumer response seems relatively consistent through the range.
Log-log instead of semi-log first stage: The results from prediction using the log of dollars-per-mile in the first stage produce very similar elasticity estimates. The semi-log form in the main model visually fits the shape of the price data better.
Fraction of each vintage remaining:
Here we include the remaining fraction of the original production for each vintage as a regressor on the right hand side of (6) . The coefficient on this new variable is negative, suggesting that quality differences in vintages are persistent over time. Including this term does not influence our elasticity estimates, however, suggesting that this sort of variation is orthogonal to cross-sectional changes in vehicle prices.
Application to Fuel Economy Standards: The Gruenspecht Effect
We now apply our scrap elasticity estimates in a simulation model to measure the magnitude of the Gruenspecht effect. We define leakage to the used market as the extent to which tighter fuel economy standards lead to increased gasoline consumption in the used fleet. We choose the example of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the United States, although used vehicle leakage applies to many similar existing or proposed fuel economy standards across the world (ICCT, 2013). The simulation is similar in structure to the model developed in Goulder et al. (2012) . We refer to that paper for details, but outline the model below.
Model Structure
We model the following economic agents: New vehicle producers, used vehicle suppliers, and households. Vehicles differ by manufacturer, age (new to 18 years old), size (large or small) and fleet (car or truck). Large and small here refer to attributes such as engine size or weight that are effectively favored or discouraged by the fuel economy regulation.
Vehicle demand is derived from the utility function of a representative consumer, who derives utility from the various vehicles and a composite consumption good. The representative consumer has a nested CES utility function with nesting in the following order: Vehicles vs. other goods, fleet, size, age, and manufacturer. At the highest nest, the consumer chooses the mix between vehicles (v) and other goods (x):
subject to a budget constraint
I is total income 19 , p v is the implicit rental price of the composite vehicle (which includes expected depreciation and fuel cost), p x is the price of other goods, ρ u is the elasticity of substitution between vehicles and other goods, and α v and α x are scale parameters. This relatively simple structure for demand focuses explicitly on car choice and scrappage, leaving miles driven and corresponding estimates of the "rebound effect" as exogenous. In our discussion below we will then compare the leakage we identify from scrappage and vehicle choice with estimates of mileage rebound from the existing literature.
We also model the supply of both new and used vehicles. New vehicle manufacturers k (7 in total: Ford, GM, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, Other Asian, European) engage in Bertrand competition and maximize profits by choosing the prices and fuel economies of four vehicle classes (combinations of fleet f and size s) subject to fuel economy standards. 20 The profit maximization problem for manufacturer k is given by:
subject to the CAFE standards for cars and trucks: 
where the decision variables p f,s and e f,s denote vehicle prices and fuel economies, respectively.
19 Total income I is exogenous and grows at a fixed rate over time. 20 Manufacturers may improve the fuel economy of individual models in two ways: via technological substitution (by changing the mix of components that are already available under today's technology, such as installing different transmissions or tires) or via technological change (discovering new technology, such as improved aerodynamic design). For details, see Goulder et al. (2012) . c f,s refers to the marginal production cost;ē C andē T refer to the CAFE requirements for cars and trucks.
Used vehicle supply is determined by last period's supply net of scrapping:
where t indexes time, a indicates age (a = 0 refers to new cars) and y f,s,a,k is the end-of-period scrappage probability. At the end of the period, all 18-year-old cars are scrapped. The scrap probability for each vehicle and vintage is endogenous and depends on the vehicle's resale value, following our model above:
where b f,s,a,k is a scale parameter that calibrates baseline scrap rates and γ is the price elasticity estimated above.
The used car purchase price p f,s,a,k is the sum of scrap-adjusted, discounted future rental prices r f,s,a,k . We assume consumer expectations for these future used prices update with current policy but are myopic with respect to future policy: Consumers expect the rental price of their used car next year to be the same as that of a one-year-older used car this year. 21 This allows us to recursively solve for used vehicle purchase prices:
where δ is the annual discount rate.
The model solves for prices and fuel economies of new vehicles and used car purchase prices that clear both new and used vehicle markets and are consistent with firms' profit-maximizing behavior. Because the set of constraints that bind for the various producers also enters we solve for equilibrium using a nested iterative procedure: Going from the "lowest" to "highest" nest, the 
Data and Parameters
We calibrate the model to prices and composition (obtained from 
Policy Experiments
We consider the recent tightening of federal CAFE standards to a target of 41. It is important to emphasize that our policy setting also has implications for a wide variety of other fuel economy standards. We keep the model here relatively simple, considering aggregate vehicles that simply represent those favored and discouraged by standards placed on new cars (then tracking how those same types of vehicles do in the used market.) This allows us to demonstrate how our estimated scrap elasticities control the Gruenspecht effect in a general setting. More richly detailed simulations could identify favored and discouraged vehicles at the level of model names and configurations, producing analysis of specific rules in Europe, Japan, or the recently adopted "footprints" in the U.S. 22 
Used Vehicle Leakage Results
We calculate the magnitude of emissions leakage to used vehicles under the fuel economy policies described above. In both the central case and the 1 MPG increment case, we consider scrap 22 Relabeling the four vehicles in our aggregate model to match categories favored or discouraged by a particular rule allows the wider range of interpretation. Leakage of the type we examine will be present for all major fuel economy policies. The E.U. standards, for example, are very similar to U.S. CAFE standards before the recent "footprint" innovation. In turn, the footprint rules create used car leakage that follows fuel economy conditioned on footprint rather than only the car vs. truck distinction. In either case the cost of new vehicles, and particularly the less efficient ones (consider versions of a pickup truck with 8-cylinder engines), rises and substitution into the used market influences prices and scrap. elasticity estimates differentiated by vehicle type and age, similar to those in Table 6 . 23 The table also explores sensitivity of the results to alternative, uniform scrap elasticities of -0.5, -0.8 and -1.0.
These values span a range that includes some of the most and least elastic subgroups in our data.
We express leakage as the fraction of expected gasoline savings (when fuel efficient new vehicles make their way through the fleet over time) that are never realized due to changes in used vehicle scrap rates. Panel A of Table 8 Panel B in Table 8 
Additional Sensitivity Analysis
We now consider sensitivity to a number of other key parameters in the simulation model. Panel C of Table 8 Symmetrically, a 50% weaker standard somewhat reduces leakage.
Next we consider a much higher gasoline price, raising it from $1.83 per gallon in the central case (the average in 2009) to $3.00 per gallon (closer to current levels). This increases leakage fairly substantially to 21%, again due to changes in the set of binding constraints and competition across firms. 25 The fourth row of Panel C assumes a lower rate of autonomous fuel economy improvements (1.0 instead of 1.8 percent growth in the exogenous component of fuel economy) and increases leakage slightly: More manufacturers are now bound by CAFE in one or both fleets.
Next, we re-parameterize the fuel economy cost function using recent estimates from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's CAFE Compliance and Effects Modeling System ("The Volpe Model ") (NHTSA, 2012). The curvature of these cost functions are about half, one third and two thirds that of our central case for small cars, large cars, and small trucks respectively, and somewhat larger for large trucks. While marginal technology costs change fairly substantially we find that leakage is affected only slightly: The Volpe Model parameters cause more of new-car gasoline savings to come from technology changes and less from mix shifting in the fleet which increases leakage on the MPG technology margin but decreases it on the vehicle mix margin. The two largely offset leaving leakage slightly higher on net.
The final two rows in the table alter the elasticity of substitution across vintages, directly influencing the mechanism by which used car leakage occurs. The more elastic is substitution between the new and used market the more leakage occurs: An increase in the elasticity of substitution by 50% (from 2.35 to 3.53) increases leakage to 15% while a decrease of 50% reduces leakage to 6%.
When considering the full variety of cases in the table two key drivers of leakage emerge:
The scrap elasticity, and the elasticity of substitution between new and used vintages. High scrap elasticities combined with large amounts of substitution into the used market make the Gruenspecht effect its strongest.
Conclusions
We estimate the sensitivity of the decision to scrap used vehicles to changes in the value of those vehicles on the used market, the scrap elasticity. Our estimates imply that changes in used vehicle prices lead to significant changes in composition and scrappage in the used fleet. This has important implications for current fuel economy policy in the U.S., Europe, China and Japan: In our simulations, tightened standards for new vehicles lead to a leakage effect that offsets 12 to 17 percent of expected gasoline savings.
The effect of used car leakage on the overall effectiveness of policy is often ignored by policy makers, even though its magnitude rivals or exceeds the often-cited mileage "rebound" effect. In order to highlight the key factors creating this leakage we investigate sensitivity to a broad range of simulation parameters: The scrap elasticity, estimated here, combines with demand elasticities between new and used vehicles as the most important drivers of leakage to the used market.
Our main empirical strategy combines variation in gasoline prices through time with finely detailed information on used vehicle values and scrap rates. We include fixed effects on the price and scrap rate for each vehicle model at each age of its life, using variation from the differential effect of gasoline price on used vehicle values depending on their fuel economies. These effects on prices become the first stage of our instrumental variables approach to estimate the elasticity of scrap rates with respect to the used vehicle's value. Our central case estimate is -0.7 with significant heterogeneity across vehicle ages and classes.
Our results on scrappage can also be applied to a range of other gasoline policies that affect the scale and composition of the used vehicle fleet, such as a gasoline tax, vehicle subsidies that target particular classes, or incentives such as scrap bonuses. Our findings also suggest an interesting overlap with the literature on local air pollution: Many of the gross polluters in terms of smog and ozone precursors tend to be the very oldest vehicles on the road. Our model and estimates of the scrap elasticity could therefore be extended to draw direct comparisons on local air pollution between fuel economy standards and gasoline taxes.
